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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Recent research has
suggested that labor markets
may not be fully competitive,
meaning workers are paid less
than the value they add.
n We develop a new approach
to measuring and estimating
“markdowns”—the gaps
between wages and the value
a worker adds—in the U.S.
manufacturing sector.
n Drawing on confidential
survey data on U.S.
manufacturers, we find
that the typical worker at
the average manufacturing
plant earns 65 cents on each
marginal dollar generated.
n The degree of monopsony
varies greatly across and
within manufacturing
industries, with markdowns
generally higher for larger and
more productive plants.
n For U.S. manufacturing
as a whole, markdowns
shrank between 1980 and
2000 but have risen sharply
more recently, suggesting
manufacturing workers are
increasingly underpaid relative
to their value.
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Monopsony in Manufacturing
Chen Yeh, Claudia Macaluso, and Brad Hershbein
Most textbook economic models assume
that labor markets are perfectly competitive. In
such a case, workers’ pay equals the marginal
contributions to their employers’ revenues, or what
economists call marginal revenue product of labor
(MRPL). For example, a worker who generates $20
more in employer revenues per hour should be
compensated $20 per hour. If an employer paid this
worker less than that, the theory says the worker
could simply switch to another employer who is
willing to pay slightly more and still make a proft.
However, many researchers and policymakers
have recently grown concerned that the textbook
model is not accurate and that employers’ market
power over workers has increased. Tis power
could arise from ways in which employers may
restrict their workers from looking for other job
opportunities, such as noncompete agreements
(Starr, Prescott, and Bishara 2021), a growing
reluctance for workers to change locations (Molloy,
Smith, and Wozniak 2014), or business mergers
that result in fewer employers competing for
workers (Prager and Schmitt 2021). However, it has
been remarkably challenging for researchers to fnd
direct and general evidence on labor market power,
and this has complicated the policy debate. Te
reason for this lack of evidence is simple: While
wages are observable in some data sets, frms’
MRPLs are hard to measure. Without the latter, it
is almost impossible to determine whether MRPLs
are equal to wages, as is predicted by perfect
competition.
In a recent paper, we develop a new technique
to show that employer market power is substantial
and widespread in the U.S. manufacturing
sector. Using this approach, we fnd that over
the past several decades, a worker in the average
manufacturing plant receives only 65 cents on
each dollar generated on the margin. Furthermore,
we construct a novel aggregate measure for labor
market power, across all manufacturing plants and
workers in the United States, to understand how
this phenomenon has evolved over time. We fnd

that employers’ market power actually decreased
between the late 1970s and the early 2000s, but that
it sharply increased in the decade or so aferward.
Our study thus provides direct evidence that
many workers are paid less than their “fair share,”

An employer with labor market
power compensates its workers
with wage rates below the
marginal revenue they add.
complementing earlier studies (as reviewed in
Sokolova and Sorensen 2020) which ofen relied on
indirect methods. Despite recent gains in worker
wages since the pandemic, employer market power
likely remains considerable.
Measuring Employers’ Labor Market Power
Under a perfectly competitive labor market,
marginal gains in employer revenues generated by
workers should go fully to workers. Te intuition
for this is straightforward: Employers that don’t
do this would see many or most of their workers
depart to competitors.
Te presence of labor market power, on the other
hand, implies that employers can withhold some of
these marginal gains. Hence, an employer with labor
market power compensates its workers with wage
rates below their MRPLs. Typically, economists have
expressed labor market power through the gap (or
ratio) between a frm’s MRPL and the wages paid to
workers, also known as the markdown.
Te main problem with measuring markdowns
is that their components are ofen not directly
observable. MRPLs are never reported (and are,
indeed, hard to measure), and even hourly wages
are not always available, even in frm-level data.
However, we show that by making some relatively
weak assumptions about a frm’s production
function—how it combines labor, capital, and
other inputs to make products—we can estimate
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plant-level markdowns. To do so, one
requires a few additional pieces of
information. Te frst is the revenue
share of each input (that is, the
efective spending on that input as

Labor market power is substantial
for U.S. manufacturing plants: on
average, workers collect only 65
cents of every dollar they generate
on the margin for their employers.
a share of a plant’s revenues). Many
frm-level data sets have revenue
share of inputs readily available,
including the confdential Censuses
of Manufacturing and Surveys of
Manufacturing we use for our analysis.
Te second component needed

is a measure of a plant’s “output
elasticities”—the percentage increase in
physical output when a particular input
increases by 1 percent. Because these
quantities are not available, we estimate
them using the rest of the data and a
fexible form for a plant’s production
function, adapted from studies of
industrial organization.
Tis “production function”
approach also allows us to distinguish
labor market power from product
market power. In other words, a frm
or plant could both pay workers below
their MRPL (a wage markdown) and
charge a price for its output product
above the competitive rate (a product
markup). Our approach allows us to
isolate wage markdowns from product
markups, an advantage over some
other methods used to estimate labor
market power. Moreover, it allows us

Table 1 Estimated Plant-Level Markdowns in U.S. Manufacturing
Industry
Petroleum refning
Computers and electronics
Plastics and rubber
Food and kindred products
Paper and allied products
Chemicals
Lumber
Primary metals
Motor vehicles
Printing and publishing
Electrical machinery
Fabricated metals
Nonelectrical machinery
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Textiles
Furniture
Nonmetallic minerals
Apparel and leather
All manufacturing

Median

Mean

Typical range

0.42
0.44
0.55
0.57
0.59
0.62
0.65
0.69
0.73
0.74
0.76
0.80
0.80
0.83
0.83
0.87
0.88
0.97
0.73

0.39
0.39
0.52
0.52
0.56
0.55
0.62
0.67
0.70
0.67
0.71
0.76
0.76
0.80
0.79
0.86
0.82
0.87
0.65

0.26–0.78
0.28–0.67
0.40–0.76
0.37–0.92
0.41– 0.85
0.37–1.06
0.47–0.91
0.50–0.98
0.54–1.01
0.47–1.16
0.52–1.11
0.60–1.05
0.56–1.16
0.62–1.12
0.58–1.23
0.66–1.24
0.58–1.44
0.59–1.65
0.45–1.22

NOTE: The numbers shown represent the fraction of a dollar of revenue generated by workers that is paid in wages
at the median plant, the average plant, and in a range of plants within one standard deviation of the mean, all for
diferent manufacturing industries. If workers are paid their full value added, the value should be 1.00. Values below
1.00 thus represent wage markdowns. Values can be above 1.00 if workers are paid above their revenue value added.
The sample size underlying the estimates is approximately 1.4 million plant-year observations. The industries shown
approximately follow 3-digit NAICS categories. See the full paper for details of the estimation strategy.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using Annual Surveys of Manufacturing and Censuses of Manufacturing, 1976–2014.
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to characterize labor market power
for each plant (or frm) in the U.S.
manufacturing sector.
Labor Market Power in the U.S.
Manufacturing Sector
Te key takeaway from our main
results, summarized in the table
below, is that labor market power is
substantial for U.S. manufacturing
plants. At the average plant, workers
collect only 65 cents of every dollar
they generate on the margin for their
employers. Because the distribution is
skewed, the markdown at the median
plant is not quite as severe, but it still
implies that half of plants pay their
workers below 73 cents on the dollar.
Labor market power is extensive
across manufacturing industries,
with the mean (and median) plant
paying wages less than MRPL in each
industry. However, these markdowns
vary considerably across industries;
they are greatest for plants in the
petroleum refning and the computer
and electronics industries, and they
are smallest in the apparel and leather
industry. Furthermore, markdowns
also vary greatly within each industry,
as evidenced by the last column,
which shows the middle range across
plants. While it is certainly plausible
that industry-level factors (such
as unionization rates) can explain
variation in markdowns, our results
indicate that factors specifc to
individual plants can be important.1
Aggregate Trends in Labor
Market Power
Te markdowns described above
apply at the plant level over our whole
sample period of 1976 through 2014.
As mentioned earlier, however, some
policymakers and academics have
suggested that labor market power
has increased over time for the whole
economy. Despite our markdown
estimates by plant and year, it is not
obvious how to combine these plantlevel measures to obtain a statistic that
refects the aggregate economy—a
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Figure 1 Aggregate Markdowns and Local Employment Concentration

1.15
Markdown/concentration (normalized)

simple (or even weighted) average
doesn’t quite work.
To calculate aggregate markdown,
we note that plant-level markdowns
are a function of output elasticities
and revenue shares. When we apply
a similar logic to the aggregate
markdown, we can derive a specifc
equation that properly weights the
plant-level markdowns, accounting for
their diferences in output elasticities,
revenue shares, and total revenues. Tis
equation for the aggregate markdown
is fexible, in that it does not depend
on how plants are assumed to combine
inputs to make a product, nor on any
particular mechanism for employer
market power.
Applying this method, Figure 1
shows how the aggregate markdown
for the U.S. manufacturing sector has
evolved over time. (We normalize
the aggregate markdown in the frst
year, 1977, at a value of 1.00, with
larger values intuitively representing
increases in employer market power.)
Afer moderately declining in the
late twentieth century, the aggregate
markdown reversed course, and
employer market power sharply
increased in the new millennium.
Because of the difculties of directly
measuring markdowns, previous
studies have drawn conclusions on
employers’ market power based on
the concentration of employment
across frms. Concentrated labor
markets—those with only a few frms—
naturally limit alternative employment
options for workers, which could
lead to employers exercising their
labor market power. Although this
argument is attractive, employer
concentration does not necessarily lead
to a wage markdown. Indeed, we fnd
that markdowns and concentration
at the labor market level are only
weakly correlated, and that their time
paths at the national, aggregate level
also diverge, especially recently (as
illustrated by the blue line in Figure 1).
Consequently, it is important to obtain
independent estimates of markdowns
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NOTE: The red line plots our measure of the aggregate markdown, normalized to have a value of 1.00 in 1977. The
blue line plots an aggregate of local labor market concentration, also normalized to have a value of 1.00 in 1977.
Details of the construction of both measures are in the full paper (Yeh, Macaluso, and Hershbein 2022).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using Censuses of Manufacturing, 1977–2012.

to draw meaningful conclusions about
labor market power.
Conclusion
Our recent research shows that labor
market power is pervasive in the U.S.
manufacturing sector. Workers are not
fully compensated for their marginal
contributions to their employers’ revenues. Instead, a worker at the average
U.S. manufacturing plant receives only
65 cents for every dollar of revenue
generated on the margin. While labor
market power is widespread, there is
tremendous variation at plants both
across and within industries.
Moreover, our aggregate measure of
markdowns for the U.S. manufacturing
sector as a whole indicates that
employers’ market power has switched
course over time, falling between the
late 1970s and early 2000s but then
sharply rising over the next decade or
so. Tis suggests that rising employer
market power is unlikely to be the

driver behind the declining share of
total income going to labor, which
started its downward trend decades
earlier.
Note: Te views expressed herein are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or
the Federal Reserve System.

Note
1. In the full paper (Yeh, Macaluso,
and Hershbein 2022), we examine
relationships between the magnitude
of markdowns and plants’ age, size,
and productivity. While plant age and
productivity do not appear to be strongly
related to the size of the markdown, plant
size does. In particular, the larger the
plant in terms of its share of employment
in the local labor market (defned by
county and industry), the higher the
markdown. Intuitively, this should make
sense: workers’ outside options are more
limited whenever the local labor market
is controlled by only a handful of plants.
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How Federal Pandemic
Relief Helped Replenish
State Unemployment
Reserves
Christopher J. O’Leary and Kenneth J. Kline
Unemployment insurance (UI)
pays temporary partial earnings
replacement to involuntarily
unemployed workers while they seek
reemployment. Starting in March
2020, as states implemented economic
shutdowns to stop the spread of the
novel coronavirus (COVID-19), UI
became a prime mechanism for income
replacement for the many workers
laid of during this time. However, the
claims for UI were unprecedented in
scope—35.4 million initial applications
for state regular benefts were fled
in the second quarter of 2020, more
than four times the previous peak
quarter, in early 2009. Consequently,
many states ran out of UI reserves and
had to borrow from the U.S. Treasury
to pay benefts. Afer passage of the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act in March 2020
and the American Rescue Plan (ARP)

Act in March 2021, several states chose
to use some of these federal relief funds
to buttress their reserves. We argue this
choice improved states’ UI reserves
and likely kept states from cutting UI
benefts.
How States Normally Finance Teir
UI Programs
Regular state UI programs can
quickly replace at least some income
for unemployed workers. States
establish weekly beneft amounts,
the potential duration of benefts,
and tax systems for fnancing these
regular benefts. From the 1950s
until afer the 2008–2009 fnancial
crisis, all states paid up to 26 weeks
of regular UI benefts and usually
replaced about 50 percent of prior
earnings, up to state maximum weekly
beneft amounts. State UI benefts are
mainly fnanced by taxes on employer

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Unemployment insurance (UI) claims reached all-time records during the COVID
pandemic, with 35.4 million applications in the second quarter of 2020 alone.
n Despite federal incentives following the Great Recession for states to shore up their
UI reserves to pay benefits, state balances were inadequate to cover the unprecedented
pandemic surge.
n The federal government paid 80 percent of the total $937 billion in UI benefit
spending in 2020 and 2021.
Chen Yeh and Claudia Macaluso are economists
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, and
Brad Hershbein is a senior economist and deputy
director of research at the Upjohn Institute.
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n Consequently, many states used special federal funds to add to their own UI
reserves or borrowed from the U.S. Treasury to avoid negative balances.
n Although the federal government backstopped the UI system, its actions may delay
states from fixing structural financing issues that will remain a problem.

